Does the university shape public debate over the long run, with no democratic check on it? In this Heterodox Academy virtual colloquium, philosopher Hrishikesh Joshi argues that it does. Drawing on Foucault, Rawls, Scanlon, Joshua Cohen and Chomsky, Joshi turns arguments usually aimed at concentrated wealth onto the modern academy. Anyone who wants to join the elite must pass through it, and professors as a group shape the questions that the elite learn to ask.
That power, Joshi argues, is democratically unaccountable by design. And because departments lean the same way across institutions, exit is not a real option: a student who dislikes one sociology department will find the same leanings at the next. He closes by suggesting that wealthy patrons may be a small check on the academy’s influence, and that greater diversity or democratic accountability of the professoriate is needed. This is one philosopher’s argument, not a new study, and the views are his own. Joshi is an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona. A transcript of his talk follows below.
Hrishikesh Joshi: Thanks for setting this up. And yeah, great to be able to share this work with you all. I’ve been interested in this question of the university system and its relation to democracy, which is, I think, relatively under-theorized. I wrote a paper on this, which came out in Philosophy & Public Affairs in February, but I’m hoping to expand this into a book project, and I’ve written several sort of follow-up pieces on my Substack, which is called Desert Philosophy. So check those out if you’re interested in this topic.
So, okay, so I want to start with a quote from Michel Foucault, who says, “Power is tolerable only on condition that it masks a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms.” And the thought is something like: in the modern context, power kind of hides itself. It doesn’t show itself. It’s not as in your face as it maybe used to be. So you think of the feudal system. Okay, you know who has the power. It’s the king and the nobles, and the serfs maybe don’t have power. And it’s obvious who has the power. The king has the power. But now power is much more subtle.
Okay, here’s an example. And this is just an example to get some intuitions going on what democracy is and what we mean by democracy, what we want from democracy. So here’s a hypothetical situation, and you can get at this in different ways, but there’s one way to get at it. So imagine there’s universal suffrage, one person, one vote. Everything gets counted perfectly accurately. There’s no gerrymandering. There’s no voter intimidation or anything like that. Everybody over 18 gets to vote. Okay, so in terms of the formal requirements of democratic decision-making, it’s satisfying that.
However, here’s the rub. All the politically relevant information, so be it about foreign relations, the economy, crime, poverty, whatever, has to be approved by the Information Board, capital I, capital B, which is appointed by the Great Leader. Again, capital letters. Is this a true democracy? You might think, okay, it’s democratic in one sense, that is, people get to vote. But look, the demos doesn’t get to make up their own minds about what information is relevant, right? So the real power here, you might think, is had by the Information Board. Okay, so that’s the kind of basic intuition I’m working off of.
Here’s John Rawls, and Rawls doesn’t talk about this particular example, but he would say, okay, so if we ask the question, is this a true democracy? Is this democratically legitimate? Is this what we want from democracy? I mean, we can use the word— I don’t want to get hung up on the word “democracy.” I mean, we can use our words however we want. But is this really what we want from democracy? And Rawls would say no. Rawls makes a big deal of the fair value of the political liberties. So the idea is something like this: democratic legitimacy will also depend on what happens before the voting booth, not just what happens at the voting booth.
This is something deliberative democrats have also defended. So there’s this rich tradition of deliberative democracy, Habermas and some others, and their idea is like, look, the voting booth is almost like an endpoint or the capstone. That’s not where the real democracy is. The real democracy is where we discuss issues with each other and so on. It’s a deliberative ideal. And another thought here is like, look, the demos must be able to decide what information is relevant. If some entity decides, look, this is the relevant information, this is the narrative, and then the demos makes its decision based on that narrative, that consent is going to be manufactured in some sense.
Here’s T. M. Scanlon, another sort of giant of Anglo-American political philosophy since World War II. And of course, Rawls is the biggest figure here. Scanlon says something very interesting. So he’s talking about economic inequality. And a lot of these authors are worried about economic inequality undermining democratic legitimacy, because the thought is something like this: if there’s a lot of economic inequality and some people are super wealthy, they’re going to get a megaphone, right? So they’re going to maybe own media companies. They’re going to have big social media platforms or what have you.
So here’s what Scanlon says: “The root problem is access to the main means of expression. Economic inequality leads to a situation in which the wealthy own and control the main means of expression,” so newspapers, what have you, “or to one in which access to those means is very expensive.” So if you want to start a newspaper, that’s very expensive, right? Only the wealthy are going to be able to do something like that. “As a result, the rich have more opportunity to influence public discussion of political questions.” That’s going to be key. “This is a problem not only for others who wish to influence political outcomes, but also for all citizens who need to be exposed to a wide range of opinion.” And this is key. So if you’re only— the Overton window is, like, restricted, and you can only ask questions or you can only operate in here, that’s going to undermine democracy, right? You need “to be exposed to a wider range of opinion in order to make up their minds how to vote and whom to support.”
Okay. Here’s Josh Cohen. He says equal opportunity for political influence. The opportunity is key because, of course, we’re not going to have equal influence, because some of us are going to be more charismatic than others or have bigger followings. Taylor Swift is going to have a bigger political influence if she says, “Go vote for this person.” More people are going to listen to her than me. Okay. But that’s fine as long as we have equal opportunity in some sense. Again, Cohen is worried about inequality of wealth, where, okay, the rich are going to have a greater opportunity for political influence. And so his recommendation is campaign finance regulations. So maybe put a cap on how much private donations. And I mean, why is that relevant? Because one of the main means that people think the rich can influence politics is by donating to politicians. You know, “Here’s a bunch of money for your campaign. Okay, but then you’ve got to listen to me or my lobbyists,” things like that.
Okay, here’s Noam Chomsky on manufacturing consent, and his worry there is something like this. Look, you know, you might say, well, people can— you know, legitimacy is based on the consent of the governed. But this consent is fake if it’s manufactured, right? If the consent is— I mean, this was his big idea, that the mass media manufacture consent by only allowing sort of a narrow range of opinion. And Chomsky is interested because he says, well, radical critique is made very unlikely or impossible in such a situation, because you turn on the TV and the Overton window is going to be here, so the radical critique over here, wherever, is not going to get a fair hearing.
Okay, so what I want to do is— okay, if all this is correct, and the focus here has been on economic inequality, what I want to do is say, turn this onto the modern university system. And I want to say— I mean, the provocative conclusion here is, if you take on board what Rawls, Scanlon, Chomsky and so on say, Cohen, there’s a real problem here. So here’s the problem. The modern academy wields enormous influence, especially over the long run. What is the reason? Well, if you want to join the ranks of the elite, you need to go through the university system.
So look at any major writer, journalist, CEO, politician, judge, lawyer, even teachers who— you know, even K–12 teachers who influence their students. They have to— you can’t be a K–12 teacher if you passed high school or whatever. And of course, yeah, journalists. If you look at the New York Times, people who write for the New York Times, do they have college degrees? Of course they do. And often they’ll have degrees from the elite institutions, you know, Dartmouth, Yale, Princeton, what have you. Okay, so college degrees are indispensable for joining the ranks of the elite. If you want to be a plumber or electrician, maybe you don’t have to. But if you want to join the ranks of the opinion shapers, the people who really wield long-term influence, those people have to go through the academy.
Even the billionaire, by the time the billionaire can influence public discourse, her worldview, and the way— even the way people ask questions, like if you look at society and you say, okay, what are the social problems here? What problems are relevant? The way you ask those questions is going to be shaped by your education. Okay. So the academy has this power to shape the Overton window, especially over the long run. And I think this influence is sort of hidden, which goes back to the Foucault thing. You think, well, who are the people who shape public discourse? You think, oh, maybe podcasters, maybe politicians, journalists. So that’s where the action lies. But really what I’m saying is, look, by the time they get to do that, they’ve already been shaped by the academy. So there’s a strong sense of power that lies beforehand with the academy.
Okay, I think professors have a lot of power. I don’t want to say individual professors have that much power, but the professoriate as a class, or as a guild, you might say, has this power. Why do they have this power? Well, students come to college in an epistemically vulnerable position. You know, you’re 18, 19. What do you know? You go to something like chemistry class. You can’t go to chemistry class and be like, “Well, I don’t believe in atoms. What are you talking about?” Right? You’ve got to take the professors at their word. And faculty are recognized experts. Like, who’s the expert at chemistry? It’s not some random person out there. It’s going to be the professor of chemistry or mathematics, what have you. So the deference is necessary, especially at the beginning.
Where this gets problematic is when it transfers over to— so chemistry is one thing, but when it transfers over to disciplines that deal with social and political issues, think sociology, anthropology, even philosophy, political philosophy, political science. If you transfer over that ethos of deference to sociology, then you have this— you know, that’s where the power lies.
Okay, you might think, well, you know, why do professors have a unique power? Don’t we get information from all kinds of sources? We listen to podcasts, we watch the TV. I think professors have a unique power because there’s all this social scientific research about, you know, if you read something multiple times, it becomes more plausible to you. So, you know, two equally plausible claims— two claims equally supported by the evidence. If I listen to one claim just once, if I hear it just once, whereas I hear the second claim, I don’t know, 30 times, the second claim is going to seep into my mind and feel more plausible.
Okay, there’s a bunch of other social science around this. There’s also stuff about the power of recall. So if you recall something for an exam, that’s a way of getting that information into your long-term memory. And that’s not true when you skim a Substack article or something, right? You’re not being tested on it. So exams and assignments are a way to get that information into your head in a way that just randomly listening to a podcast or something is not.
Okay, so now we’ve got shaping the elites. The second main issue is that this power is unaccountable, democratically unaccountable. So say sociology professors, for example, are not appointed by legislators or democratic representatives, or they’re not voted for by the demos. And that’s, in fact, guaranteed by the ideal of academic freedom. The ideal of academic freedom is meant to shield professors, especially after tenure, from donors or from political representatives and so on. So this is almost by design. So there’s a sort of unaccountability that’s there by design.
Okay. So there’s unaccountable power here. So yet the sociology professor wields enormous influence, especially over the long run. And there’s a sort of captive audience here, right? When you go to podcasts— I mean, there’s a million podcasts out there, but I have a choice as to what podcast to listen, or people have a choice. When you step into the class, you don’t have a choice as to what to read or what questions get asked, right? Those are determined by the syllabus.
Okay. Okay, now contrast this with the market. So in the market— so there’s this nice book by A. O. Hirschman called Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. So these are three ways in which we can respond to institutions. One is exit. So if you don’t like an institution, you can leave it. Another is voice. So if you don’t like the institution, you can try to change the institution with voice. So you can vote, or you can write op-eds, or you can, you know, write memos or whatever. And loyalty is like, maybe you like the institution, and then you’re loyal to it.
Notice, in a competitive market, so not in a monopoly but in a competitive market, you have robust exit. So suppose I like sandwiches, but I hate Subway. I don’t like how Subway makes its sandwiches. I may not get— I may not be able to— like, I’m one customer, after all. I may not be able to get them to change how they make their sandwiches. But I have exit. I can go to Jimmy John’s. There’s thousands of other sandwich shops I can go to. If I don’t like sandwiches, I can go get tacos, ramen, whatever, what have you.
Now, you might think, hey, isn’t this true of the academy? I mean, like, no one’s forcing you to go to Stanford. If you don’t like Stanford, you could go to Princeton. If you don’t like Princeton, you could go to Michigan or Harvard, wherever, assuming you get admission. That, I want to say, is illusory. So that would be true in a case where— to take sociology, for example, that would be true if— here’s an imaginary world, and we can just think how distant this world is from our current world. Imagine Stanford sociology leans libertarian, Michigan leans socialist, Harvard leans conservative, Princeton leans left liberal. Then you could say, hey, you don’t like this, you don’t like what they’re teaching at Stanford, go to Harvard.
That’s not true, because if you look at sociology departments, just to pick one— I mean, you could run this on other disciplines, anthropology— if you look at the sociology department at Stanford, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, wherever, they’re all going to lean the same way, right? They’re all going to lean the same way. So there is no choice of exit. There’s no exit. You know, there’s exit— I mean, these are not nominally distinct institutions. So you have, well, Yale is different from Stanford. But if you look at what is taught, the political valence of what is taught, it’s all roughly the same.
Here’s a graph to bring this out. And I know HxA members will be familiar with this graph. But this is just— and I don’t want to lean too heavily on these ratios of Democrats to Republicans. But I mean, the extent of these ratios is one thing, right? So it would be one thing if it’s like, okay, like, you know, Democrats outnumber Republicans, but it’s like 70% Democrats or something. Sociology, it’s like 43.8. So that means in a room of 100 sociologists, you’ll have like two Republicans, and they’re probably closeted. They would probably want to say, “I’m a Republican.” So, you know.
Okay, and you notice the most balanced fields are the ones that don’t deal with social issues. So engineering is the most balanced field, 1.6 Democrats to one Republican. But engineers are not talking about the root causes of poverty or capitalism or immigration or what have you, right? Those issues are going to be talked about here. And these ratios are just, like, you know, mind-blowing.
It’s not just— it’s a— party affiliation is one thing. And by the way, I just want to note that some people might say, well, it’s the recent populist moment that’s driving this. But I mean, there’s data from 2000. If you look at 2000, the ratios are similar, maybe not as skewed as now. But okay, this is faculty ideology. So this is not like, you know, are you Democrat or Republican, but like, are you— and FIRE, among others, has done a bunch of surveys like this. And you notice the— I forgot the x-axis here. Sorry about that. But the— yeah, the ratio— I mean, you don’t really need the x-axis to see the trend, right? There’s a trend here.
Okay, what is the cause of this homogeneity? Maybe it’s innocuous. So one innocuous hypothesis would be maybe reality has a— people say reality has a liberal or left-wing bias. Or maybe it’s self-selection or personality. Those would be innocuous. But there’s a lot of evidence of discrimination, especially at the hiring stage. So I can go into the details in the Q&A, but there’s just mounting evidence that non-left applicants are discriminated against at the hiring stage.
There’s also other sorts of evidence. So it’s not just— forget the academy for a moment. We know that in a situation of affective polarization, people will reward their own side. So this is a study from 2015, again, well before the notorious election of 2016. So this is not just a new thing, right? 2015, right? So they say this experiment is just like two identical CVs of high school seniors, and you change the partisan affiliation, and it turns out that partisans will discriminate against out-party members. And this is symmetric, by the way, so Republicans will also discriminate. But given the academy, it’s not symmetric, because in the academy, the partisan affiliation is so skewed.
I won’t go into this too much here, but I argue in the paper that regardless of what kind of theory of democratic legitimacy you take, this is going to turn out to be problematic. So on any theory, on any plausible theory of democratic legitimacy, it’s going to turn out that the current system is not democratically legitimate. So if you want a sound clip or something, I would want to say that the most provocative way of putting this is— and by the way, this mirrors the critique from the left from the ‘60s, ‘70s onward. The critique is, look, you think you live in a liberal democracy, but you really don’t, because we’re not aware of how power actually works.
Just in closing, a couple of things. So I want to say, so in contrast to what a lot of people have been saying— look, wealth is a power problem for democratic legitimacy— I want to maybe turn that around. Maybe economic freedom, which results in wealth inequality, maybe is the only small check to the power of the academy. So Milton Friedman has this old paper, which is very much worth reading, on the relation between economic freedom, political freedom. I won’t go into it in detail, but he argues that economic freedom is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for political freedom.
One thing he says that’s sort of underappreciated from that essay is— he says, “This is the role of inequality of wealth in preserving political freedom that is seldom noted: the role of the patron.” So the patron is a person who, you know— if you have an idea, if you want to do a radical critique, if there are wealthy patrons out there, at least that’s unchecked. You can go to the wealthy patron and say, “Okay, fund my ideas,” or something. And notice he says, well, Marx— how is Marx able to do his thing? Well, Marx wouldn’t have been able to do his thing without Engels, who was his wealthy patron. Right.
Okay, so what is the upshot here? So contrary to what many people have argued— they think, look, economic inequality undermines democratic legitimacy— I want to say, look, the homogeneity of the academy undermines legitimacy, and the only sort of small check— and I think it’s a small check because, as I mentioned, even the billionaires have to go through the— you know, how many billionaires don’t have a college degree? I mean, we can think of a couple, but most of them have a college degree, right? So the ability to convince even one wealthy patron can check the oligarchic power of the academy. Shout-out, you know, if any wealthy patrons are listening, I’m open for business here.
Okay, nonetheless, this is far from enough. I want to say what is needed is greater diversity and/or democratic accountability of the professoriate. So we have to rethink some of the ideas of academic freedom and the role of— you know, what is the purpose of the university system?










